TERMINOLOGY FOR SPEECH PRESENTATION TECHNIQUES

Scholars studying how speech is presented use two overlapping perspectives for classifying the different possibilities. Narratologists generally focus on the degree and nature of the resemblance between a presentation of speech and the speech that is being presented; linguists are more interested in the specific language features of different techniques of presentation that distinguish one from another, such as how deictic words like "you" or "tomorrow" are handled. Both of these approaches contribute to the definitions of speech presentational terms used in this study.

Most scholars of narratology who study speech presentation have related

the different techniques to each other in one of two ways. Some have presented a set of discrete possibilities, each of which is clearly defined but at the same time contains a good deal of variety. An example of such a system is Genette's three categories of narratized speech, transposed speech in indirect style, and character speech.[17] Others have favored a scalar or spectrum approach, either by defining a larger number of categories of speech presentation that are not as clearly distinguished from one another (such as McHale 1978, followed by Rimmon-Kenan 2002) or by questioning the usefulness of the whole idea of "categories" in analyzing speech presentation strategies (Fludernik 1993: ch. 5). Fludernik, who critiques the process of naming and categorizing methods of presenting speech and thought more thoroughly than any other person who has written on the topic, points out that although the scalar approach she favors has the advantage of describing most accurately the range of presentations that are actually found in narrative texts, this approach can become bogged down in its own subtleties and vitiate the categories it comprises (Fludernik 1993: 284).

Sternberg (1991) notes that many of the features that supposedly characterize individual modes of speech presentation in fact do not, and that direct, free indirect, and indirect discourse all can do most of the things that the other modes do, and/or things that they are not supposed to be able to do. He is in essence following a spectrum approach to these terms, although he does not say so. Perhaps as a result, he does not sufficiently acknowledge that although it is indeed an overstatement to call it a *rule* that (for example) indirect speech does not admit imperatives, it is perfectly true to say that this and similar statements remain accurate and useful as *general tendencies*. These categories do not lose their legitimacy as categories because their boundaries are fluid.

All of these scholars are striving to develop systems for describing speech presentation that can explain as wide a range of texts as possible. For Homeric poetry, which contains a small number of different methods of presenting speech that can be fairly clearly distinguished one from another and that display relatively little variation within individual categories, there is no need to worry about describing a wide range of subtly different approaches to speech presentation. Accordingly, this study is based on a few discrete categories of speech presentation, whose definitions are given below.

Traditionally, the notion of "mimesis" has been used as a criterion for organizing different modes of speech presentation.[18] Since Plato first used this as a term of narrative analysis in the *Republic* (392d), it has been used to refer to so many different aspects of narrative that it brings up as many

problems as it solves as a term of analysis.[19] Recent discussions of direct speech have proposed that what it provides is *not* the imitation of the "actual words" of the supposed speaker, even in non-fictional situations where there is such a thing as "actual words."[20] No one interpretation has taken the place of "imitation of the original." In one view, what is important about direct speech is that "a voice other than the narrator's appears to take over";[21] other explanations of the effect of direct speech include offering the appearance rather than the reality of an original utterance, or requiring the audience to participate more directly as interpreters of the narrative.[22]

A different way of distinguishing speech presentation modes from one another concerns the perspective of the deictic words in the presented speech, such as pronouns and temporal words. The term "deixis" covers the various words and grammatical structures (such as verb tenses, personal pronouns, and demonstratives) that take their meaning from the specific time and place of the utterance in which they occur.[23] For example, the pronoun "you" has no intrinsic meaning; it has only a relational meaning based on some "I" that appears in or is implied by a particular utterance. Similarly, "here" or "tomorrow" do not designate any stable place or time. They refer to a place or time relative to the spatio-temporal perspective of the sentence in which they occur. In direct speech, the verb of speaking and the speech are deictically separate: the deictic words in the reported speech present the perspective of the quoted speaker. So, in the sentence, "Mary said, 'I left my hat on the bus yesterday,'" her speech refers to person and time in terms that are oriented toward herself, not toward the reporter who says, "Mary said. . . ." In indirect speech, deixis in the reported speech is oriented to the reporting speaker. Mary's speech about her hat would then look something like, "Mary said that she had left her hat on the bus yesterday," or "Mary said that she had left her hat on the bus last Friday."[24] Here Mary and the time of the incident are referred to from the perspective of whoever is telling us about Mary and her hat. In free indirect speech, some deictic features are oriented toward the speaker of the presented speech and some toward the voice that presents Mary and her speech.

The speech presentation spectrum used here is essentially the one that is used by the linguistically oriented critics Leech and Short.[25] Their spectrum contains five methods of speech presentation: speech mention, indirect speech, free indirect speech, direct speech, and free direct speech. The most concise option for presenting a given speech act is "speech mention,"[26] which tells the audience that an act of speaking took place without giving any indication of the words that the speaker used. This approach treats speech as a narrative event. In Homeric poetry, speech mentions gen-

erally take the form of speaking verbs without direct objects (e.g., αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥ' εὔξαντο καὶ οὐλοχύτας προβάλοντο, "And when all had made prayer and flung down the scattering barley," *Iliad* 1.458)[27] or speaking verbs with object accusatives (e.g., ἄειδε δ' ἄρα κλέα ἀνδρῶν, "He was singing of men's fame," *Iliad* 9.189). In "indirect speech," the text goes some way toward presenting the form and/or the content of an utterance (e.g., κηρύκεσσι λιγυφθόγγοισι κέλευσε / κηρύσσειν ἀγορήνδε κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιούς, "He gave the word now to his clear-voiced heralds to summon / by proclamation to assembly the flowing-haired Achaians," *Od*. 2.6–7). In this study, any speech presentation that is introduced by a verb of speaking is considered to be indirect speech if it makes some attempt to present the content and/or form of the utterance (i.e., it is not speech mention), and it also uses the same deictic center in both the verb of speaking and the reported speech (i.e., it is not direct quotation).

A great deal of recent scholarship has focused on the variously named phenomenon that I am calling "free indirect speech."[28] Free indirect speech, unlike indirect speech, lacks an introductory verb of speaking. In traditional accounts of free indirect speech, it combines the perspectives of indirect speech (by shifting verb tenses and personal pronouns to the presenting speaker's deictic orientation) and direct speech (by presenting other features, such as demonstratives, from the deictic perspective of the speaker of the utterance). Thus, free indirect speech can include the voice of both a presenter of the speech and the speaker of that speech. Most scholarship claims that this technique originated with modern fiction,[29] and it is closely associated with defining features of modern fiction such as stream of consciousness (McHale 1978: 276–278).

The following quotation from Jane Austen's *Emma* gives a typical example of free indirect discourse (FID) in fictional narrative. It presents the thoughts of a vulgar and self-satisfied character named Mrs. Elton, whom the narrator repeatedly mocks. This passage immediately follows a direct quotation of Mrs. Elton's reply to an invitation.

> No invitation came amiss to her. Her Bath habits made evening-parties perfectly natural to her, and Maple Grove had given her a taste for dinners. She was a little shocked at the want of two drawing rooms, at the poor attempt at rout-cakes, and there being no ice in the Highbury card parties. Mrs. Bates, Mrs. Perry, Mrs. Goddard and others, were a good deal behind hand in knowledge of the world, but *she* would soon shew them how every thing ought to be arranged. In the course of the spring she must return their civilities by one very superior party—in which her card tables should be set out with their separate candles and unbroken

> packs in the true style—and more waiters engaged for the evening than their own establishment could furnish, to carry round the refreshments at exactly the proper hour, and in the proper order.[30]

This passage uses the tense and pronoun shifting of indirect speech (here "she" and "was" at the end of the second line rather than Mrs. Elton's own "I am"); it retains the quoted speaker's perspective for deictics such as "now," as in direct speech; and it uses some expressive and stylistic features not permissible in indirect speech, such as vocatives, exclamations, and word choice (here the clue that the passage is FID rather than the narrator making fun of Mrs. Elton is the italicized *she*).

It has recently been argued that a number of premodern literatures do contain free indirect speech.[31] One persuasive reading is that in fact, both of these arguments are at least somewhat accurate: free indirect speech is used to present *speech* quite regularly in premodern texts (including Homeric epic), but its use for the presentation of *thought* becomes widespread only in the nineteenth century.[32] At all events, this technique has received essentially no attention in relation to Homer.[33] Though free indirect speech is not one of the most prominent speech presentation strategies in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, it is by no means absent: both the main narrator and the characters use it, generally as a continuation of a speech that begins as unambiguously indirect speech. Free indirect speech in Homer functions, for the most part, just as theoretical treatments of it would lead us to expect. We recognize instances of free indirect speech mainly because they follow instances of indirect speech with which they are associated (McHale 1978: 268). And, although free indirect speech frequently entails emotional effects (empathy, irony) when used to present thought, it generally has either no particular emotional impact or an ironic effect when used to present speech.[34] Probably scholars have not pointed out free indirect speech in Homer because it lacks the explicitly expressive elements found when it is used in modern fiction. In fact, other premodern texts besides Homeric epic contain free indirect speech that lacks such expressive markers, and these expressive elements are not a requirement for free indirect speech.[35]

Free indirect speech in Homeric epic is much shorter than the example from *Emma*, but it usually follows indirect speech, and like the Austen quotation, it presents ambiguous information that might belong either to the presenting narrator or to the speaker being presented. For instance, in *Iliad* 9 (274–276), when Odysseus tells Achilles that Agamemnon will swear an oath that he never slept with Briseis, he includes a relative clause in free indirect speech.

ἐπὶ μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμεῖται
μή ποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι ἠδὲ μιγῆναι
ἣ θέμις ἐστίν, ἄναξ, ἥ τ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἥ τ᾽ γυναικῶν.

He will swear a great oath
that he never entered into her bed and never lay with her
as is natural for human people, between men and women.

Verse 275 presents the oath with indirect statement, and the relative clause in 276 might be either part of the oath or Odysseus' aside to Achilles. Although this instance of free indirect speech lacks features like irony or clear signals of speaker focalization, ambiguity about whether it belongs to Agamemnon's oath or to Odysseus' presentation of the oath marks it as free indirect statement.

"Direct speech" is the only speech presentation strategy in Homer that has already been widely studied. Studies of direct speech in Homer have generally assumed that its defining characteristic in comparison to indirect speech—and therefore, the reason it predominates so heavily over indirect speech—is its faithfulness to a putative "original" speech and its vividness;[36] a cogent critique of faithfulness and reproducibility suggests that direct speech is distinguished by its potential to reproduce whatever *can* be reproduced about an "original" utterance, although the reproducible elements fall short of the entirety of the reported speech event.[37] That is to say, we can imagine that we are hearing the character's own words (if not a complete and exact replica of a speech event) after a verse like τὸν δ᾽ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς ("Then in answer again spoke Achilleus of the swift feet"; 12 instances in the *Iliad*), whereas we have no such expectation for an expression like θεοῖσι δὲ θῦσαι ἀνώγει / Πάτροκλον ("[He] told his companion, Patroklos, / to sacrifice to the gods," *Iliad* 9.219–220).

LINGUISTICS AND SPEECH: SPEECH ACT AND MOVE

Various linguistic attributes of individual speeches strongly affect which of the speech presentation techniques just described is likely to present the speech. These features include what kind(s) of speech act are depicted in the speech; how the speech functions within a conversational exchange; and the subjective aspects of the speech, or its *expressivity*. Indirect speech in Homeric poetry, as I have already mentioned, is supposedly associated with directives, but in fact, directives are characteristic of Homeric speech in

general. This basic misunderstanding shows that Homeric speech presentation cannot be properly understood without taking into account the nature of the speech being presented.

"Speech act type" is a way of classifying speeches that grows out of the work of Austin.[38] His central insights—that speech not only states facts, but does things, or states feelings; that utterances cannot be understood without a context; and that utterances can be fruitfully classified and studied based on these features—have formed the basis of speech act theory. The typology of speech acts that Austin created, however, has not won general acceptance. There is no single criterion—or group of related criteria—that is consistently used as the basis for the categories in his typology.[39] Rather, he seems to take a quite impressionistic approach, both in what distinguishes one category from another and in what justifies the existence of something as a category at all.[40] The five families of speech acts Austin proposes at the end of *How to Do Things with Words* do not elicit unambivalent agreement even from Austin himself.[41] Almost immediately, commentators began to overhaul, rework, and criticize Austin's categories. Even today, there is no particular "speech act typology" that is generally considered to be the consensus approach. Instead, different versions of speech act typologies proliferate, and scholars working on aspects of speech act theory tend to produce their own typology of speech acts as part of their inquiries.[42]

Different speech act typologies include different speech act types, and are based on different criteria for classifying the individual speech acts. The speech act typology used in this book categorizes different types mainly according to what they are about—facts, emotions, and/or actions—and secondarily according to the orientation of the speech act toward the speaker, toward the addressee, or (sometimes) toward a third party.[43] Speaker and addressee orientation will also play a central role in defining various subtypes of the large categories. The speech act types that I use in this study, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section, are directives (speech about action), assertives (speaker-oriented speech about fact), questions (addressee-oriented speech about fact), and emotives (speech about feelings).[44]

How a given speech is presented in Homeric poetry relates not only to what kind of speech it is (its speech act type), but also to its role within an interactional exchange.[45] In an unjustly ignored but important point, Bassett (1938) asserted many years ago that the kinds of speech that appear in non-direct forms are those which are "outside of the dialogue" (106). Homeric speeches that form part of an exchange (a conversation) differ in both content and presentation from those which appear singly. For example, the

kinds of speech that are most frequently presented with non-direct speech are the same kinds that tend to appear singly rather than in conversational sequences when they are directly reported. This includes not just orders, but similar speech act subtypes like oaths, prayers, and so forth. Hence, we need to know where a speech falls in (or outside of) a conversational structure in order to understand speech presentation.

A further development of speech act theory adds information about how a particular speech works within an interactive structure. A "move" is essentially a speech act in a conversational context:[46] "speech act" defines a particular utterance as a directive, assertive, and so forth in terms of particular linguistic and grammatical features of the utterance, whereas "move" concentrates on how a particular utterance operates in its context. Kroon (1995: 66) defines a move as "the minimal free unit of discourse that is able to enter into an exchange structure. . . . A move usually consists of a central act (which is the most important act in view of the speaker's intentions and goals) and one or more subsidiary acts, which also cohere thematically with the central act."

The same basic categories apply to moves as to speech acts (a move can be a directive, assertive, question, or emotive), but the interactive perspective of move terminology entails a second dimension. Moves are classified both by what they are trying to do and by where they are in the interactional structure of the exchange in which they occur. So, a move can be initiating, reactive, or problematic, depending on whether it begins a new topic or theme (initiating), responds satisfactorily to a topic begun by a previous move (reactive), or somehow objects to or refuses to go along with the previous move (problematic).[47] Problematic moves are both reactive and initiating at the same time.[48] Most often, one initiating and one reactive move form an exchange, but from time to time a reactive move itself elicits a reaction,[49] or two different speakers react to the same initiating move,[50] particularly in a conversation that involves more than two speakers.

The following exchange between Iris and Achilles illustrates most of the permutations of what types of moves there are, how a move overlaps with an individual speech, and how individual moves interact to form an exchange. When Iris goes to Achilles in *Iliad* 18 and tells him to defend Patroclus (170–180), this is an initiating directive. Rather than immediately go along with this directive, Achilles asks not one but two questions about it (182 and 188–195). These are problematic moves: they are reactive insofar as they respond to the directive, but they are also initiating because they invite a response from Iris. Iris answers both questions in reactive assertive moves (184–186, 197), and then repeats the directive a second time after an-

swering Achilles' second question (198–201). This directive does not constitute a new move, but a continuation of her initial directive move at 170–180. This exchange illustrates several possibilities for how move and individual speech overlap. The first speech, Iris' directive, contains one move. It begins and ends with repetitions of one directive (170–172, 178–180), while the middle section consists of subsidiary assertive acts that are intended to persuade Achilles to follow the directive. Achilles' question at 182 consists of a single question with no subsidiary acts. Iris' final speech at 197–201 contains an assertive in answer to a previous question (reactive) and a directive. Here the directive is not a new move because she has already given this directive once before, but other speeches commonly introduce an initiating directive move after a reactive move.[51] In contrast to direct speeches like this one, which contains both a reactive assertive and an initiating directive, non-direct speeches usually contain just a single move.

Move terminology offers one way of describing the conversational dimensions of speech.[52] Expressivity provides another. As we will see, the move of a particular speech in Homeric epic and the expressive features it contains, as well as its speech act type, are relevant for understanding how the speech is presented. Expressivity offers a useful tool to describe in a quantitative manner what direct speech conveys that non-direct speech usually does not, and more importantly, what effect this has in a narrative. Expressivity is a somewhat slippery catch-all term covering the features of an utterance that make it the speech of a particular person with feelings about what he says.[53] What distinguishes linguistically oriented discussions of expressive features from what a narratologist might say about (for example) focalization is primarily their focus on understanding the vehicles for conveying emotions and judgments rather than the specific emotions or judgments conveyed. Moreover, expressive elements may convey nothing more than that a particular speaker *is* the speaker (such as first-person forms) without implying any additional feeling on his part. Besides first- and second-person forms, expressive elements also include vocatives, exclamations like ὤ μοι, and language that contains evaluations, emotions, and reasoning by the character speaking.[54] As we will see, the interchange of conversation itself has an expressive value in Homeric poetry. Systematically bringing this idea to bear on Homeric epic has several benefits. We can see in a new way just how much of direct quotation in Homeric epic consists of expressive features rather than propositional content, and by extension, how central that expressive quality is to the poems. Non-direct modes of speech presentation have expressive qualities, too, which we are more likely to notice if expressivity is identified as one of the dimensions

of speech presentation. These forms of expressivity make a positive contribution to the shape and effect of Homeric narrative that complements the more vivid and noticeable expressivity of direct quotation.

DEFINING A SPEECH ACT TYPOLOGY: SPEECH ACT TYPES AND SUBTYPES

As with terms for modes of speech presentation derived from narratology, I have chosen a system of speech act terminology that uses the fewest and clearest available terms that are nonetheless up to the task of describing speech in the Homeric poems: too much terminology is cumbersome to use and puts off nonspecialists, whereas too little or insufficiently specific descriptive language leads to analysis that is too general to be useful, or that leaves out important features of what is being studied.[55] Questions and assertives are both about facts.[56] Whereas an assertive is speaker-oriented ("The cat is on the mat"), questions seek out a position about some fact from the addressee ("Is the cat on the mat?"). An emotive speech act such as "I wish the cat were on the mat!" presupposes a fact and gives the speaker's feelings about it. Directive speech acts are aimed at getting some action accomplished. The directive "Put the cat on the mat" presumes certain facts, such as the cat not (yet) being on the mat. Commissives, where the speaker commits himself to a future action, hardly ever appear as the main speech act in Homeric epic,[57] and accordingly are not included as part of this taxonomy.[58] Instead, promises function as assertives, either to provide inducements to comply with a directive to the addressee, which is the main act, or in some more diffuse way to provide a guarantee for what the character presenting the promise is trying to achieve with his own speech.[59] In Homeric speech, promises are best understood not as committing the speaker to a particular course of action, since that is rarely the main point of the utterances in which they occur, but instead as one of a variety of assertions that characters make to each other in order to produce compliance with a directive.

The category "directive" contains a number of subtypes depending on how obligatory the directive is and whether the directive advances the interests of the speaker, the addressee, or both.[60] The speaker may give the addressee an option not to obey: noncompliance is essentially not available for an order,[61] but is possible in the case of a request[62] or a plea.[63] The proposed action may benefit the addressee as well as the speaker, as in a suggestion like "Let's X," the subtype to which battlefield exhortations belong.[64] An invitation makes an optional directive in which the speaker has

a moderate interest.[65] Supplication, a plea conducted in a particular way,[66] benefits primarily the speaker, who generally tries to persuade the addressee to go along with his speech with emotional inducements of various kinds rather than by asserting his own power—usually the speaker has little or no power relative to the addressee—or by trying to align their interests.[67] Directives may have negative consequences attached, generally within the speaker's control (a threat)[68] or not (a warning).[69] Instructions provide a series of directives for accomplishing a particular end in which the speaker does not have a strong interest. Instructions take the general form "If you want to accomplish X, do A, B, C," but generally speaking, the speaker of instructions is involved because of knowledge about X rather than interest in getting it done (Sadock 1974: 139–142).[70] Permission, a reactive directive, falls outside such a scheme,[71] as does prayer, a kind of specialized or exaggerated plea in which a mortal issues a directive to a god.[72]

Messages in Homeric poetry generally convey directives by means of an intermediary (a messenger), who has a moderate interest in the directive in addition to the more lively interest of the originating speaker. These are essentially two-stage directives. First, the originator of the message gives an order to the messenger to deliver a particular message to a third party.[73] The messenger satisfies this first directive by setting out on a journey to the intended recipient of the message. Second, the messenger delivers the message, usually itself a directive,[74] to the recipient. The messenger has an interest in seeing that the recipient acts on the message, and messengers regularly urge recipients to comply with a message even where their own emotions might seem to align their interests with the recipient rather than the originator of the message.[75] When a speech is not quoted directly, sometimes it is impossible to tell from the context what kind of directive is depicted (an unspecified subtype). Indeed, characters who report directives often do not distinguish among different subtypes, presenting directives simply with a form of κελεύω and an infinitive.[76] All of these directive subtypes either use directive sentence types (usually an imperative, infinitive, or hortatory subjunctive), or they are not quoted and leave unclear what the subtype is. Directives that are directly quoted but whose content does not clearly convey that the speech act is a directive are implicit directives.[77] The context identifies these speech acts as directives, but the speech act itself does not make this explicit. Although implicit speech acts are very common in most languages, especially for directives, they are quite rare in Homeric poetry. Indeed, the main narrator often points out explicitly speeches where the speaker's intentions are significantly at variance with what he actually says.[78] This implies that the audience was not accustomed to speech that appeared to say one thing but actually meant something else.

The most common subtypes of assertives, statement and reply, are distinguished by whether they are oriented toward the speaker (statement)[79] or the addressee (reply).[80] Other kinds of assertives bring in various kinds of third-party authority for the statement being made. Oaths guarantee a statement that the speaker makes about himself, generally by invoking a god.[81] Oaths can be about a state of affairs either past, present, or future. Clearly an oath referring to the past or present is an assertive; because Agamemnon's oath that he did not sleep with Briseis[82] and oaths about future actions[83] are presented the same way, all Homeric oaths are classed as assertives.[84] Prophecy, a related kind of assertive that is less speaker-oriented, makes a statement about the future that is about something other than the speaker and is guaranteed by a god or some kind of supernatural intervention.[85] Song[86] is classified as a kind of assertive because it clearly involves a commitment to the accuracy of the speech act, since Homeric characters refer to poets in terms of their knowledge of what they sing about[87] or praise them for singing as though they had been personally present at the events in their songs.[88] It seems to be mainly addressee-oriented, insofar as characters can ask a poet to sing some particular song and poets are not described as singing when no one is present to hear them.[89] At the same time, song differs from other speech act subtypes, because although an audience is necessary and the audience is often depicted responding to a song, the listeners are not so much addressees as an audience. This is a different kind of interaction than most conversation, even though interaction between a speaker and a listener takes place.

Questions have few variations that depend on the speaker or addressee orientation. Rather, questions vary primarily in relation to particular social contexts, where a small group of speech act types are used in different ways depending on the situation.[90] These variations are important and interesting, but they do not translate into speech act subtypes. Questions can become more speaker-oriented than the prototypical addressee orientation in two ways. First, questions regularly appear in directive rather than interrogative sentence types, where the speaker orientation of the directive form heightens the speaker orientation of the question.[91] A smaller subset of questions[92] poses a more speaker-oriented question subtype by asking not for information unknown to the speaker, where the focus is on the addressee's knowledge of that information, but for information that the speaker already knows.[93] Here, the goal of the question is not finding out the requested information, but exercising power by asking a question to which the speaker already knows the answer.

Emotives, as Risselada notes, are a grab-bag category.[94] Emotive subtypes are mainly speaker-oriented, but challenges aim at producing fear in

the addressee.[95] Encouragement, conversely, seeks to create a positive frame of mind in an addressee.[96] Breaking down emotives broadly into those that express positive emotions and those that express negative ones, we find in the former category vaunts (satisfaction that an enemy is dead),[97] greetings (pleasure in the arrival of someone), and farewells (good wishes to a departing guest).[98] Negative emotions motivate laments (sorrow on behalf of a dead person).[99] Wishes, which express dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs insofar as they express the speaker's desire for a different one, also belong in this category.[100] Emotives about sorrow express dissatisfaction with a current state of affairs without expressing a clear preference for something else instead; they are weaker and less ritualized than laments.[101] Rebukes have elements of both an emotive and a directive speech act: the speaker expresses dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and (at least implicitly) a directive to the addressee(s) to do something different. These two elements occur in different proportions in different rebukes. Some instances primarily express dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and make a directive to change it only by implication rather than explicitly stating any particular action or result that the speaker desires. Given the diffuse nature of the directive component of such rebukes, and the metadirective quality of speech in general (Risselada 1993: 44), it seems most appropriate to view these as emotives.[102] Other rebukes rather perfunctorily refer to the speaker's dissatisfaction as an inducement to go along with a much more fully developed directive,[103] and these make most sense as directives.

One subtype of emotive speech act consists of speeches that the speaker makes to himself. The same kind of language that introduces speech also introduces these monologues or soliloquies, most commonly the formula ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν ("And troubled, he spoke then to his own great-hearted spirit").[104] The προς + (ἔ)ειπε combination is one of the most common ways to introduce direct quotation, so it is clear that these speeches are presented as though they are direct quotations, too. Whether this is literally the case has been widely debated.[105] For my purposes, what is important about these is that they are *presented* as if they were speech, not whether they are "actually" speech or thought. All of them in some way convey the speaker's emotions—hence the frequent appearance of ὀχθήσας, "troubled," in the introductory verses and of emotional exclamations at the beginning of the speech—so they are classified as a subtype of emotive speeches.

For the most part, assertives, questions, and directives have typical sentence patterns that correspond to the speech act type. However, sentence type and speech act type do not always coincide. Questions in Homeric po-

etry are most often presented with interrogative sentence types, but they are also presented not only with directive sentence types (as noted earlier), but also with assertive sentences: "I want to know who broke that glass."[106] Conversely, an assertive like "It's cold in here" can be a statement of information (someone has asked, "Is it cold in here, or is it just me?") or an implicit directive (to close the open window). Where the sentence type and the speech act type of a given speech act differ, the "speech act type" entered in my database is the sentence type, and the "speech act subtype" is the actual function of the utterance in its context. Usually this is simply a matter of using a nontypical sentence type (as in the common case of a question presented as a directive), but some of these speech acts are implicit (as in the question cited in note 106).

DATABASE CONTENT AND DESIGN

The data that underlie the majority of this book are collected in a FileMaker database that I constructed and then revised several times over a multi-year period. In hindsight, there are some features that I would have designed differently, and in spite of many iterations of careful editing and standardizing, I am sure that mistakes and inconsistencies remain.[107] The database contains information about each presentation of speech in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. The FileMaker format allows searches that not only tally a single feature, such as the number of speeches presented with direct quotation, but also collate multiple features of speech presentation, such as directives in indirect speech presented by the main narrator of the *Iliad*, or directives presented by characters except for those presented by Odysseus. For each speech presentation, the database includes the citation (work, book, starting and ending verse numbers); the length of the speech in verses based on the number of verses in which some part of the speech is presented;[108] the narrative level at which the speech is presented (main narrator, character narrator, ambiguous between the two, third level of character narration); the names of the speaker and addressee of the speech, as well as their genders;[109] the Greek word(s) of speaking that introduce or present the speech and the verse number(s) in which the words appear; for non-direct speech modes, any subordinate clauses depending on the verb of speaking; and the speech act type(s), subtype(s), and move type(s) of the speech. Speeches embedded within character speech collect most of this information a second time for the characteristics of the speech within which the speech is embedded.

Not all of these fields are equally important for my analyses, which fo-

cus mainly on three features of speech presentation: what level of narrator is reporting the speech; what kind of speech presentation is used; and various facets of the speech act being presented. Because this book focuses on how speech acts build on each other to create conversations, and what effect conversational exchange itself has on speech presentation, only the main speech act of each speech is tabulated. Some speeches have two main speech acts within them, but subsidiary acts (such as statements that explain why a directive should be obeyed) are not counted separately except under specific circumstances, which are explained as they arise.

Many directives presented by characters present the action that the enclosing speech is ordering the addressee to do. Thus, there is a sense in which directives are overrepresented in my database, since I have counted a speech like *Odyssey* 21.350–353 as a directive twice.

> ἀλλ᾽ εἰς οἶκον ἰοῦσα τὰ σ᾽ αὐτῆς ἔργα κόμιζε,
> ἱστόν τ᾽ ἠλακάτην τε, καὶ ἀμφιπόλοισι κέλευε
> ἔργον ἐπίχεσθαι· τόξον δ᾽ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει
> πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐμοί· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ᾽ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.
>
> Go therefore back into the house, and take up your own work,
> the loom and the distaff, and order your handmaidens
> to ply their work also.[110] The men shall have the bow in their keeping,
> all men, but I most of all. For mine is the power in this household.

The direct quotation overall presents the directive that Telemachus gives to Penelope, which in this case has two components. One is an action (attending to her own work), and the other is a speech (giving a directive to the maids). So, Telemachus' directive presents a second speech that is also Penelope's desired action, a further directive. I have tallied this speech overall as a directive from Telemachus to Penelope, but within that, I have tallied as a separate directive the directive by Penelope that Telemachus presents with indirect speech. The direct quotation is a directive presented by the main narrator; the underlined indirect speech presents a different directive, presented by a character to his addressee. These two directives have different properties as speech presentation—they occur at different narrative levels, are presented with different forms of speech presentation, and present two different speeches—so they are counted separately.

My main interest is in what Homeric characters say and how the audiences of the poems gain access to those speeches. The speech-related phenomena that I did not include in my data have been left out because in various ways they do not provide access to what people in the poems are

saying: the references omitted are either not about speech, or are not about presentation. The largest category of arguably speech-related references that I have not included, from a numerical standpoint, is presentation of thought. Thought presentation and speech presentation differ substantially, particularly in premodern literature (Fludernik 1993: passim). Accordingly, thought presentation does not appear in this study, although clearly there is fascinating work to be done comparing speech and thought presentation in Homeric poetry. Some Greek words depict events that might or might not be speech. For instance, I have not counted objects of the verb προΐημι as speech presentation unless the context requires that understanding, since προΐημι depicts a wide range of actions, many of which are nonverbal.[111] The boundary between presenting speech and presenting action is regularly a hard one to draw, and this verb gives a particularly clear example of that.

A short presentation of a speech that occurs at greater length elsewhere does not present the speech to the audience; rather, in order to help the audience follow the train of events or to position a speech within a conversational sequence, such cross-references point to a speech presentation that either has already happened or is about to happen. Cross-references are counted if they go beyond conventional references like ὡς ἐκέλευες, a phrase that regularly appears in character speech to position a particular speech within a conversational exchange and is normally not counted as speech presentation. For instance, an especially detailed presentation of what someone has already said, or one that characterizes a speech as a different kind of speech act than it appears to be from the main presentation, attempts to re-present the speech as something different from its original appearance, and so such instances are included. References to one's own speech, such as εὔχομαι εἶναι, are not presenting the speech so much as characterizing it as a particular sort of speech. Finally, I have not counted references to talking about speech in general terms, such as how someone talks, because these do not present the content of a specific speech.

17. Genette 1980: 171–174. For a slightly different three-pronged model composed of direct speech, indirect speech, and free indirect speech, see McHale 1978: 250. Laird 1999 also uses such a model (see Chapter 3), with record of speech act (which I call speech mention) and free direct discourse as additional categories.

18. McHale 1978 distinguishes three different categories of what I call indirect speech based on the degree of mimesis in each one. Bers (1997: 3) states that "compared to *oratio obliqua*, direct 'reports' may carry a stronger flavor of undiluted *mimesis*." Richardson (1990: 86) uses the expression "imperfect quotation" to refer to indirect speech.

19. Sternberg 1982b is a superb analysis of the range of meanings that mimesis has in criticism and the lack of a clear and consistent connection between mimesis and any one mode of presenting speech.

20. Semino and Short (2004: 166–167), in contrast, want to retain faithfulness as a criterion for evaluating speech presentation.

21. Laird 1999: 90. Leech and Short (1981: 324–325) organize their overall speech presentational spectrum according to the degree to which the narrator is "apparently in control" of the speech being presented. They recognize the limits of this approach with their adverb "apparently."

22. For the appearance of an original utterance, see Fludernik 1993: 30. For audience as interpreters, see Collins (2001: 74) who calls this phenomenon "methexis," explicitly contrasting it with mimesis as the defining characteristic of direct speech.

23. Sternberg (1982a: 110) and Li (1986: 34) provide definitions of deixis in direct and indirect speech. Coulmas 1986 is a useful discussion of issues of deixis in direct and indirect speech, primarily from a linguistic point of view.

24. It is important to note here that indirect speech is not a derivative or copy of a direct speech "original," or vice versa. Banfield (1982: 25–37) demonstrates that neither can be derived from the other.

25. Leech and Short 1981: 318–336, largely affirmed by Semino and Short 2004. For other useful discussions of speech presentation categories, see McHale 1978; Genette

1980: 171–175; Rimmon-Kenan 2002: 109–110 (largely following McHale); Fludernik 1993: passim; Laird 1999: 87–100; Collins 2001: 92–150.

26. I use this term in preference to Leech and Short's more cumbersome "narrative report of speech act" (1981: 323). This technique is also called "diegetic summary" (Rimmon-Kenan 2002: 110) or "narratized speech" (Genette 1980: 171).

27. All Greek quotations are from the Oxford editions of Allen and Munro; translations are from Lattimore 1951 and Lattimore 1965 unless otherwise noted.

28. Fludernik 1993 is the most thorough and comprehensive study of free indirect discourse (her term). For a survey of terminology, see McHale 1978: 249 n. 1. I use the term "speech" rather than "discourse" because I will be focusing on the use of this technique to present speech, not thought.

29. Most influentially, Banfield 1982: e.g., 228–230. Banfield states that "the claim that instances of the style can be found in Greek and Latin finds little credence . . . and no plausible examples have been proffered to support this claim" (228).

30. Vol. 2, ch. 16 (Austen 1988: 290).

31. Fludernik 1993: passim, e.g., 91–98 (primarily on medieval French and Chaucer); Collins 2001: 133–150, on medieval Russian court records. See also Leech and Short 1981: 332, on seventeenth-century British court records. Sternberg (1991: 65 and passim) asserts that FID appears in the Hebrew Bible, but Miller (1996: 81–90) disagrees.

32. This arises from Fludernik's examination of Chaucer, who uses free indirect speech almost exclusively for speech rather than thought (1993: 93–94), alongside the general observation of Leech and Short (1981: 344–347) that techniques for presenting both speech and thought—like free indirect speech—are distributed quite differently as presentations of speech versus presentations of thought.

33. Richardson (1990: 71) identifies free indirect speech as "a late invention."

34. Fludernik 1993: 291, following Leech and Short 1981.

35. *Pace* Banfield 1982, ably refuted on this point by Fludernik 1993. Collins (2001) and Laird (1999: e.g., 99) both detach free indirect speech from any specific defining feature at all. Collins connects it instead to "the very fact of a heteroglossic source" (134).

36. E.g., Létoublon 1983: 41, "Quand il rapporte des paroles au style direct, il fait semblant de croire et de vouloir faire croire qu'elles ont été réellement prononcées telles quelles" ("When he [the poet] quotes speeches in direct style, he pretends to believe, and to want to make others believe, that they were in fact said like that"). This is also implied by Richardson (1990: 197): "Homer presents his narratees with something like the view of the story they would have if they were to watch it directly."

37. Sternberg 1982b: 149 and passim. Collins (2001: 51) suggests that direct speech has to do with an intention of "verbatimness" rather than the actual achievement of it.

38. Most famously, *How to Do Things with Words* (1962).

39. Noted by Searle 1976; see also Alston 2000: 85–89.

40. See Austin 1962, Lecture XII in particular.

41. He concludes rather unhappily that his most problematic category, expositives, "seem both to be included in the other classes and at the same time to be unique in a way that I have not succeeded in making clear even to myself. It could well be said that all aspects are present in all my classes" (Austin 1962: 151). This gives a clear sense of the limitations of Austin's terminology.

42. Risselada (1993: 32 n. 18) provides references for a number of these.

43. This typology is based on Risselada 1993: 32–45, which organizes speech acts along two main axes, namely, what the speech is about and whether it is oriented to-

ward the speaker or the addressee. Risselada provides a clear speech act typology, a persuasive justification for her overall approach to constructing a system of speech acts, and a useful overview of the different kinds of speech act systems that other scholars have suggested. Givón (1990: 779–818) provides a hugely detailed description of the permutations of these, although he does not include emotives in his typology, presumably because he is talking about sentence types rather than speech act types.

44. Searle calls emotive speech acts "expressives," but here and elsewhere, I use the term "emotive" to avoid confusion with the use of "expressive" to mean "subjective features of a particular utterance."

45. The next several paragraphs closely resemble Beck 2008b: 358–360.

46. My discussion of "move" derives mainly from Kroon 1995: 58–95. Other useful studies include Edmondson 1981; Roulet 1984; and Risselada 1993: 49–62.

47. This kind of move has been called by a number of different names: "problematizing reaction" (Risselada 1993: 58); "challenging" (Burton 1980: 142 and 150–152, where she explains the different reactions that a challenging move can entail); "nonpreferred" (Kroon 1995: 91).

48. This is the most context-dependent move type of the three: a refusal to follow a directive is a reactive move if the refusal is not challenged by the person who issued the directive, but problematic if it leads to a discussion of the refusal.

49. For instance, when Priam asks an initiating question (*Iliad* 3.192–198), there are two reactive moves that follow it: Helen replies by identifying Odysseus (200–202), and then Antenor talks about Odysseus at length (204–224).

50. As when Idaeus orders Ajax and Hector to cease their duel in *Iliad* 7 (279–282, initiating), and Ajax and Hector each react individually (284–286 and 288–302, respectively).

51. E.g., *Od*. 3.331–336, where Athena accedes to a previous directive (331, reactive assertive), and then makes a new directive (332, initiating directive) with several subsidiary assertive acts explaining why this directive is a good idea (333–336).

52. See also Beck 2008b: 352–353.

53. Benveniste (1971: 224) coins the term "subjectivity" for "the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as 'subject,'" that is, to shape his utterance according to his own emotions and perceptions. Most other scholars use the term "expressive" for those features of language and speech that are related to or depict the consciousness of the speaker; e.g., Banfield 1982: passim; Fludernik 1993: esp. ch. 4; and Collins 2001: 35, which identifies expressivity with emotion.

54. Fludernik 1993: 228. Her focus in her chapter about expressivity is primarily on linguistic and syntactical indications of expressivity, such as hesitation, repetition, emphatic preposing of words, and so on.

55. For example, Searle (1976) lists 12 dimensions that distinguish different illocutionary acts from one another (although he does note that just three of them are the most important of the group [5]). This approach, however useful it may be in thinking about the theory of speech acts, seems to me to be too extensive to be useful in understanding a large corpus of actual speech acts.

56. I use the term "question" for "interrogative speech act" and "interrogative" for "interrogative sentence type." Risselada 1993: 63–78 discusses the relationship between sentence type and speech act type.

57. Commissives appear just four times in speech presented by the main narrator: *Iliad* 13.368–369 (indirect speech), 14.233–241, 21.369–376 (both direct quotation); *Od*.

4.6–7 (indirect speech). Both of the directly quoted instances accompany a directive. Alston (1994: 40–45) suggests that the speaker of such a speech act takes responsibility for a particular state of affairs rather than committing himself to accomplishing it.

58. This contrasts with the common practice of making promises and similar speaker commitments to future actions a separate category of speech act (Searle 1976).

59. Promises within characters' speech are discussed in Chapter 4.

60. A similar but less detailed discussion of directive subtypes appears at Beck 2008b: 356–357. Risselada 1993: 48 provides a diagram of directive subtypes arranged by degree of "bindingness" and whether the main interest in having the desired action accomplished belongs to the speaker or the addressee.

61. E.g., *Iliad* 11.313–315 (Odysseus to Diomedes).

62. E.g., *Od*. 5.173–179 (Odysseus to Calypso).

63. E.g., *Iliad* 9.464–465 (Phoenix's kinsmen to him, reported by Phoenix).

64. E.g., *Iliad* 15.486–499 (Hector to Trojans).

65. *Od*. 4.60–64 (Menelaus to Telemachus and Peisistratus).

66. Gould (1973) argues for the importance of physically touching the addressee, about which there has been substantial disagreement. Alden (2000), in an excellent discussion at 198 n. 52, agrees, but Pedrick (1982), Crotty (1994: 16–21), and Naiden (2006: 44) do not.

67. *Iliad* 24.486–506 (Priam to Achilles); note 477–478, ἄγχι δ' ἄρα στὰς / χερσὶν Ἀχιλλῆος λάβε γούνατα καὶ κύσε χεῖρας ("[Priam] . . . stood close beside him / and caught the knees of Achilleus in his arms, and kissed the hands").

68. E.g., *Iliad* 3.414–417 (Aphrodite to Helen).

69. E.g., *Od*. 19.71–88 (Odysseus to Melantho). A warning, similar to a threat except that the speaker does not control the negative consequences that may follow the addressee's actions, appears just twice (also *Iliad* 22.358–360, dying Hector to Achilles). Either a threat or a warning may be an assertive if the speaker does not say what the addressee should do instead of whatever he is currently doing.

70. E.g., *Od*. 5.339–350 (Ino to Odysseus). Recipes, although not found in Homeric epic, are a useful way to think about what instructions are for.

71. E.g., *Iliad* 4.25–29 (Hera to Zeus).

72. E.g., *Iliad* 15.372–376 (Nestor to Zeus).

73. E.g., *Iliad* 8.399–408 (Zeus to Iris).

74. E.g., *Iliad* 8.413–424 (Iris delivers the message cited in the previous note to Hera and Athena). Informational messages are surprisingly uncommon in Homeric poetry (18 instances out of 141 speeches that include a message speech act); Chapter 6 discusses them in more detail. When the content of a message is an assertive, the origin of the message is still a directive to the messenger to go to the addressee, but the delivery of the message is an assertive.

75. For example, when Thetis brings Achilles a message from Zeus, she urges him to return the body of Hector to Priam partly on the grounds that her message comes from Zeus (*Iliad* 24.128–137).

76. E.g., *Iliad* 22.101–102, where Hector presents a directive given him by Polydamas (ἐκέλευε . . . ἡγήσασθαι, "He ordered [me] to lead" [my translation]). This might present an order, a request, or a rebuke, to name three possibilities.

77. E.g., *Iliad* 5.421–425 (Athena to Zeus), where the speech itself is simply a statement describing the current state of affairs, but contextual features like the main narrator's introductory language (419) and Zeus' response identify the speech as a directive.

For the term "implicit" rather than "indirect" (the more common word for speech acts whose form and contextual meaning differ substantially), see Risselada 1993: 90–92.

78. Odysseus' wily words provide notable examples of this. For instance, the narrator explains that Odysseus' story to Eumaeus about gaining a cloak from "Odysseus" at Troy was intended to test Eumaeus and see whether he would give a cloak, too (14.459–461). Probert and Dickey (2005) point out that imperatives are surprisingly common (by contemporary standards) in Athenian tragedy, suggesting that this is a consistent feature of ancient Greek, at least as far as implicit directives are concerned.

79. E.g., *Od*. 3.212–213 (Nestor presents a statement by an unspecified "they" about Penelope's suitors).

80. E.g., *Od*. 19.27–28 (Telemachus to Euryclea). Occasionally, replies may be expressive (e.g., *Iliad* 22.233–237, Hector to Athena disguised as Deiphobus, where Hector's speech responds to the previous speech by describing his feelings), or even unspecified speech act types (always in character-presented non-direct speech, such as *Od*. 3.265–266, where the verb ἀναίνετο shows that Clytemnestra spoke a reply, but not what kind of speech act it was).

81. Kitts (2005: 97–99) discusses the speech act dimension of oaths.

82. *Iliad* 19.258–265. When Agamemnon originally offers to swear the oath at 9.132, he says μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμοῦμαι ("I will swear a great oath").

83. As when Telemachus extracts a promise from Eurycleia not to tell Penelope about his intended trip in search of information about Odysseus until he has been gone for a while, or until Penelope asks about him: ὄμοσον μὴ . . . τάδε μυθήσασθαι ("Swear to tell . . . nothing about this," *Od*. 2.373). Telemachus does not mention the gods as guarantors of the oath, but the main narrator does when reporting that Eurycleia did as she was bidden (γρηῢς δὲ θεῶν μέγαν ὅρκον ἀπόμνυ, "The old woman swore to the gods a great oath," *Od*. 2.377).

84. *Iliad* 23.43–47 contains an oath invoking Zeus, identified as an oath (ὅρκον ὄμοσσεν, "swore an oath," 42, to introduce direct quotation), in relation to an utterance that is unambiguously an assertive.

85. E.g., *Od*. 13.173–177 (Alcinous presents a prophecy from the past by his father, Nausithous).

86. E.g., *Od*. 1.154–155 (Phemius among the suitors).

87. E.g., Penelope to Phemius, πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλλα βροτῶν θελκτήρια οἶδας / ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε ("Phemios, since you know many other actions of mortals / and gods, which can charm men's hearts," *Od*. 1.337–338).

88. E.g., Odysseus to Demodocus, ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας ("As if you had been there yourself or heard it from one who was," *Od*. 8.491).

89. The bard that Agamemnon left to guard Clytemnestra, who is banished by Aegisthus to a lonely island as part of his campaign of seduction (*Od*. 3.267–271), is the lone exception to this.

90. Minchin 2002 surveys some of these patterns in the *Odyssey*.

91. E.g., *Od*. 15.167–168 (Peisistratus to Menelaus). This is the most common variation from the prototypical question, which combines an interrogative sentence type with a question speech act. Approximately one-quarter of questions are presented this way (48 of 198).

92. E.g., *Od*. 1.222–229 (Athena to Telemachus), 21 of 198 questions.

93. Minchin (2002: 26–31) discusses these questions under the heading of "control questions."

94. Risselada calls it "a convenient wastebasket for a number of quite heterogeneous speech act types" (1993: 40). Emotives are also the only speech act type that is not associated with a particular sentence type.

95. E.g., *Iliad* 5.277–279 (Pandarus to Diomedes).

96. E.g., *Iliad* 4.184–187 (Menelaus to Agamemnon).

97. E.g., *Iliad* 22.331–336 (Achilles to Hector). In contrast, de Jong (2004b: 201) classifies these as assertives because "the speaker tells how (he thinks) things are."

98. E.g., *Od*. 1.133–134 (Telemachus to Athena) and *Od*. 8.461–462 (Nausicaa to Odysseus), respectively.

99. E.g., *Iliad* 24.725–745 (Andromache to Trojan women, for Hector).

100. E.g., *Od*. 17.496–497 (Eurynome to Penelope).

101. E.g., *Iliad* 8.352–356 (Hera to Athena).

102. At *Iliad* 23.439–441, Menelaus complains about Antilochus' driving during the chariot race without specifying an alternative course of action. Here I differ from Minchin (2007a: 23–51), who argues that a directive element always occurs as part of a rebuke. See in particular her final element for rebukes, "a proposal for amends: new action on the part of the addressee" (28).

103. E.g., *Iliad* 16.422–425, where Sarpedon begins a rebuke by saying to the Lycians, αἰδώς, ὦ Λύκιοι· πόσε φεύγετε; νῦν θοοὶ ἔστε ("Shame, you Lykians, where are you running to? You must be fierce now"). He rebukes them with the question and then tells them what to do instead.

104. This formula appears eleven times (7 times in the *Iliad*, 4 times in the *Odyssey*).

105. Most extensively by Pelliccia 1995. Edwards (1987: 94) argues that the introductory verbs "indicat[e] that they are thought of as uttered aloud rather than as simply the unspoken thoughts of the character." Létoublon (2001: 247) calls these speeches "discours intérieur."

106. *Od*. 17.306–310, where the disguised Odysseus makes a comment about his dog Argus that is introduced with verb ἠρείνετο ("ask, inquire") and functions as an implicit question.

107. Semino and Short (2004) make clear that this is an inevitable part of constructing such a database. They worked on theirs for much longer than I did with a team of several researchers to assist them, and nonetheless, they wryly note in their conclusions, "We have . . . been left with a certain amount of frustration that, in spite of all the time we (and others) have devoted to it, our corpus still contains mistakes and inconsistencies, which, in an ideal world, we should correct" (226–227). They go on to say that the database overall is accurate and useful as a research tool, which the review by Hardy (2007) and frequent citations by other authors confirm. My database is available online at http://www.laits.utexas.edu/DeborahBeck, along with a more detailed discussion of these issues.

108. So, a speech in the first half of one verse and the second half of the next counts as two verses long. This is not a very exact measurement, but the length of speech presentations does not feature prominently in my analysis, so a more exact measurement is not needed.

109. Plural speakers and addressees were tallied as a variant of gender, so the options for gender are three. This is not the way I would have done it if I were designing the database from scratch, since gender and number are not (as it turns out) particularly similar in their patterns and effects, but the accuracy of my figures on the num-

ber and gender of speakers and addressees is not affected by this suboptimal design feature.

110. Th is clause is slightly adapted from Lattimore, who renders it "See to it that . . ."

111. Pelliccia 1995: 37–57 provides an excellent overview of the uses of προΐημι.